News
Real Estate
[03/09]
E-House Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2009 Results and Declares Cash Dividend
[03/09]
CRIC Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2009 Results
[03/08]
Bairdwarner.com Offers Exclusive Online Search Engine for Investors & Prospective Buyers of Area Foreclosed Properties
Case Summaries
Bankruptcy Law
[03/08]
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. US
In an action by a law firm seeking declaratory relief, arguing that plaintiff was not bound by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act's (BAPCPA) debt relief agency provisions and therefore could freely advise clients to incur additional debt and need not make the requisite disclosures in its advertisements, the Eighth Circuit's order rejecting the district court's conclusion that attorneys are not "debt relief agencies" under BAPCPA, upholding application of BAPCPA's disclosure requirements to attorneys, and finding BAPCPA section 526(a)(4) unconstitutional, is affirmed in part where: 1) attorneys who provided bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons were debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA; and 2) BAPCPA section 528's requirements were reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception. However, the court of appeals' order is reversed in part where BAPCPA section 526(a)(4) prohibited a debt relief agency only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor was filing for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose.
[03/08]
In Re: Ray
District court's judgment affirming the bankruptcy court's dismissal of two Chapter 11 proceedings was correct, but the decision is vacated, as the law firm lacked standing where there is no evidence that one of the law firm's former attorneys ever informed the bankruptcy court that it was appearing on behalf of the firm and the record is devoid of any mention of the firm by the attorney or any other party.
[02/15]
In re: Barner
In debtor's appeal from the bankruptcy court's ruling finding that an automatic stay did not apply to a foreclosure sale of her home, the order is affirmed where: 1) 11 U.S.C. sections 362(d)(4) and (b)(20) did not prohibit enforcement of a 2004 order lifting the automatic stay as to debtor's residence; and 2) the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act did not modify or affect orders issued in cases filed before its effective date.
Consumer Protection
[03/09]
Martinez v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.
In an action under Section 8(b) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), claiming that a mortgage lender charged plaintiffs an illegal underwriting fee, dismissal of the complaint is affirmed where: 1) the clear and unambiguous language of RESPA Section 8(b) did not reach the practice of "overcharging"; and 2) the UCL claims alleging "unfair" and "fraudulent" conduct were preempted by the National Bank Act, and the allegations of "illegal" conduct failed to state a claim.
[03/08]
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. US
In an action by a law firm seeking declaratory relief, arguing that plaintiff was not bound by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act's (BAPCPA) debt relief agency provisions and therefore could freely advise clients to incur additional debt and need not make the requisite disclosures in its advertisements, the Eighth Circuit's order rejecting the district court's conclusion that attorneys are not "debt relief agencies" under BAPCPA, upholding application of BAPCPA's disclosure requirements to attorneys, and finding BAPCPA section 526(a)(4) unconstitutional, is affirmed in part where: 1) attorneys who provided bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons were debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA; and 2) BAPCPA section 528's requirements were reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception. However, the court of appeals' order is reversed in part where BAPCPA section 526(a)(4) prohibited a debt relief agency only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor was filing for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose.
[03/02]
Pfizer v. Sup. Ct.
In plaintiffs' action against Pfizer, the manufacturer of Listerine mouthwash, pursuant to the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law claiming that Pfizer marketed the mouthwash in a misleading manner by representing that the use of it can replace the use of dental floss in reducing plaque and gingivitis, defendant's petition for writ of mandate seeking to overturn an order certifying the class action is granted as the ruling certifying a class consisting of all persons who purchased Listerine in California during a six-month period is overbroad, and In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009), does not require a different disposition in this case.
Debt Collection
[03/08]
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. US
In an action by a law firm seeking declaratory relief, arguing that plaintiff was not bound by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act's (BAPCPA) debt relief agency provisions and therefore could freely advise clients to incur additional debt and need not make the requisite disclosures in its advertisements, the Eighth Circuit's order rejecting the district court's conclusion that attorneys are not "debt relief agencies" under BAPCPA, upholding application of BAPCPA's disclosure requirements to attorneys, and finding BAPCPA section 526(a)(4) unconstitutional, is affirmed in part where: 1) attorneys who provided bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons were debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA; and 2) BAPCPA section 528's requirements were reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception. However, the court of appeals' order is reversed in part where BAPCPA section 526(a)(4) prohibited a debt relief agency only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor was filing for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose.
[02/26]
Office Depot Inc. v. Zuccarini
In a judgment debtor's appeal from an order appointing a receiver to take control of and auction off some of debtor's domain names in order to satisfy the judgment, the order is affirmed where: 1) Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003), was still an accurate statement of California law, and domain names are intangible property subject to a writ of execution; and 2) domain names were personal property located wherever the registry or the registrar were located.
[02/22]
Cianbro Corp. v. George H. Dean, Inc.
In an in rem maritime lien action, district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and an order issuing a declaratory judgment to the effect that plaintiffs' vessels were not subject to a maritime lien in favor of defendant is affirmed as defendant failed to make the factual showing that it provided necessaries to the vessels as is required by 46 U.S.C. section 31342(a).
False Advertising
[03/02]
Pfizer v. Sup. Ct.
In plaintiffs' action against Pfizer, the manufacturer of Listerine mouthwash, pursuant to the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law claiming that Pfizer marketed the mouthwash in a misleading manner by representing that the use of it can replace the use of dental floss in reducing plaque and gingivitis, defendant's petition for writ of mandate seeking to overturn an order certifying the class action is granted as the ruling certifying a class consisting of all persons who purchased Listerine in California during a six-month period is overbroad, and In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009), does not require a different disposition in this case.
[02/12]
Thorogood v. Sears Roebuck & Co.
In plaintiff's class action lawsuit claiming that defendant-company sold dryers that were misrepresented as containing stainless steel drums in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, after a remand following decertification, is affirmed as the district judge was within his discretion in deciding that no attorney's fees should be awarded.
[01/21]
Total Call Int'l Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.
In plaintiff's action against its insurance company claiming that it had improperly declined to defend plaintiff in litigation arising out of its advertising activities, trial court's judgment sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint is affirmed where: 1) the fact that a third party complaint mentions an element of a covered claim does not trigger the duty to defend when the facts known to the insurer, viewed as a whole, establish that no such claim is potentially asserted; 2) there was no potential for policy coverage in view of the nonconformity exclusions, which bars coverage for advertising injury arising out of the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statement of quality or performance made in the insured's advertisement; and 3) trial court properly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.